Integration of airpower in the Army's predominant domain of land warfare has always been and remains a tricky business that requires compromise and tough choices. From the introduction of the airplane in 1907 until 1947 the US Army was the master of its own destiny. Evidence and lessons learned during combat in World War II led to the creation of a separate and equal branch of the armed forces, the US Air Force. Overnight, the Army found itself reliant on air support capabilities wholly contained in a separate service with its own ideas on how airpower is best utilized. This dependency and the resulting friction resulted in the start of a competitive symbiotic relationship characterized by power struggles for missions, compromises over roles and responsibilities and never enough resources to make either side content. Today's rapidly changing strategic environment, limited resources, and diverging service strategies mean that Army - Air Force competition will increase requiring even more compromise in the future. This monograph examines the relationship and spirit of cooperation between the Army and the Air Force over the years to uncover a framework for compromise based on historical precedence that can be used today to ensure sound initiatives that bolster national security, maintain service specific strategies and ensure the gaps and seams that exist between the air and land domains are not a US vulnerability. Following the Army's shift to its AirLand Battle doctrine in 1982 the Chiefs of Staff of the Army and Air Force created a small group of Army and Air Force Officers charged with achieving service level compromise wherever the Army and Air Force missions intersected or overlapped. The group produced thirty one proposed initiatives that remain the single largest and most successful service compromise to date. The 31 Initiatives, as they would be called, provide a historical example of successful service level compromise that the Army and Air Force should emulate to continuously improve the air land enterprise. In 1991, Operation DESERT STORM provided evidence the 31 Initiatives and AirLand Battle were successful. The same year, the end of the Cold War eliminated the Soviet Union as the peer competitor AirLand Battle was designed to defeat. Since the end of the Cold War the Army and the Air Force have been transforming themselves to meet potential enemies of the future. The strategic operating environment has changed considerably since the 31 Initiatives were released and acted upon. The Army's new operating concept released in October 2014 is a large departure from its AirLand battle doctrine of 1982. The Army's new operating concept, entitled Win in a Complex World, combined with new information age technologies and declining defense budgets indicate it is time once again for the Army and Air Force to clearly define the strategies and initiatives required to ensure the air and land domain seams remain unavailable for exploitation by our ever-evolving 21st century foes. The Army Operating Concept, Win in a Complex World, provides the impetus and a starting point for another round of Army - Air Force compromise and set of initiatives that are required to ensure America's role as the preeminent air land power on the planet. Examining how the 31 Initiatives achieved similar results following the Army's move to AirLand battle provides a glimpse of what a new round of service-level compromise might produce.

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)