The US joint force continuously attempts to meet policy aimed at the survival and prosperity of the nation. The dialog between the policy maker and military adviser requires a broader and deeper understanding to align strategy and means to constantly shifting policy. This monograph employs an interdisciplinary qualitative chronological case study of the Iraq war from the initial attack in 2003 through the end of the "Surge" in 2008. It examines the joint force's attempt to adapt to policy with the means available, and the strategy that emerged. Understanding the complexity of local to global interaction and relationships from the singular individual to international and trans-national institutions can assist adaptation. The joint force adapted in Iraq from 2007 to 2008 to the operational environment and US policy aims.

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)