The First Canadian Army's performance during the Normandy Campaign has received mixed criticisms by allies and historians alike. Montgomery, as commander of the British 21st Army Group, was very critical of the Canadian Army for what he perceived as a lack of speed and boldness. Despite these criticisms, the Canadian Army performed admirably in many cases. Its achievements, particularly in the months following the Normandy invasion, testified to its ability to learn and adapt. This was evident in its clearance operations along the English Channel coast, aimed at alleviating the Allies' supply problems and enabling Montgomery's pursuit across the Ruhr. Montgomery ordered Crerar to capture the port city of Boulogne, as it would provide one good Pas-de-Calais port. Lieutenant-General Simonds, II Corps commander, assigned the 3rd Canadian Infantry Division to capture Boulogne, one of Hitler's coastal fortresses. The Germans defenders had a division-sized element, while the understrength 3rd Division only had two brigades available for its main assault. Notwithstanding their disadvantaged position, the Canadians achieved their mission. The aim of this monograph is to examine the effectiveness of the 3rd Division's performance by looking at three key elements: the commander's ability to adapt his understanding of the environment to an operational method, his ability to visualize an operational method based on his understanding of his mission, and his ability to describe and direct the operation. These elements will help determine whether the division's capture of Boulogne was due to pure chance or rather to its ability to effectively plan and execute a challenging operation.

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