When the leading figures of the Middle Eastern and North African mujahedeen left the battlefields of Afghanistan in the late 1980s, fresh from their perceived victory over the Soviet Union, little thought was given to the threat they posed to their home nations and western powers. The emergence of Al-Qaeda Core and Osama bin Laden in the early 1990s, with its hardline Salafist agenda and ideologically motivated volunteers, heralded a new era of globally-orientated terror activity aimed at both the near enemy, the apostate Islamic regimes and the far enemy, the West. This expansive agenda posed a fundamental problem for al-Qaeda Core, which was one of size and scope. Al-Qaeda Core was a small organization, rich in financial and experiential terms but it did not have the volume of operatives required to sate its twin lines of effort against the near and far enemies. This led to the formulation and declaration by Osama bin Laden of a global defensive jihad and a fatwa against the apostate Islamic states and their western backers. This declaration was a unifying call-to-arms, and an attempt by al-Qaeda Core to align Islamist terror organizations across the globe under the al-Qaeda banner; Osama bin Laden had attempted to solve his problem of size by syndicating the al-Qaeda brand. In order for this approach to be successful the affiliated groups must be subservient to their master Osama bin Laden, and their activity (tactical actions) must support the clearly-stated strategic aims of the guiding organization, al-Qaeda Core. This monograph assesses the relative success or failure of this approach by evaluating the tactical actions of al-Qaeda Core and three of its affiliated groups, Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), al-Shabaab, and the Islamic Emirate of the Caucuses (IEC). The case studies explore the origin, leadership, ideology, and tactical actions of the groups identified in an effort to analyze the relative success, or lack thereof, of "brand" al-Qaeda. The fundamental tension between the transnational aims espoused by al-Qaeda Core and the nationalist agendas which are at the heart of the affiliates actions are blindingly apparent. It is quite clear that some 16 years after the declaration of the global jihad, al-Qaeda Core is no closer to realizing its strategic aims and has in fact seen its status drastically reduced; syndication has apparently failed.

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)