The warfighter of tomorrow will face an increasingly complex battlefield and should expect an adaptive and creative enemy. The Theater Air Control System (TACS) after Desert Storm became the de facto standard, even though the structure emerged during the conflict. As a result, the United States Air Force designated the Air Operations Center as a Major Weapons System and solidified the conceptual structure of the TACS. To date, the ability of the TACS to effectively accomplish centralized command and control has varied due to increased information gathering capabilities, which, in turn, requires improved information management and distribution. This monograph explores the following question: How can the United States Air Force modify the TACS to optimize the translation of strategy into advantageous effects on tomorrow's battlefield? The theory of Complex Adaptive Systems provides a framework to examine the TACS, specifically focusing on the variety of agents, interaction of agents, and selection mechanisms for adaptation. The TACS adapted throughout Desert Storm by modifying processes and organizations. Desert Storm provides insight into leverage points of effective and ineffective adaptation of the TACS. Successful adaptation indicates that increased variety or diversity of agents and purposeful behaviors are beneficial to overcoming complexity. Leaders play a key role in creating an environment of cooperation, collaboration, and competition that encourages innovation and risk-taking. Inaccurate Battle Damage Assessment failed to recognize the learning and adapting enemy and hindered Desert Storm operations. The TACS should embrace the creation of ad hoc organizations and networks to solve complex problems and then should adapt to integrate these solutions. The TACS must anticipate future needs then adapt to meet those needs through effective leadership that encourages innovation and diversity of ideas.

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