During recent years the subject of how wars end has become of greater interest within the profession of arms. Operationally and tactically, the U.S. Army looked at the problem in Iraq and Afghanistan in terms of numbers and tonnage. Closing a theater and managing force levels are mechanical actions, where commanders work to meet constraints. The true challenge for those practicing the operational art is achieving strategic goals, in part or in whole, through the arrangement of tactical actions in time, space, and purpose where effects reach past the military end state. Achieving a strategic goal must enable the nation's political civilian leaders to favorably negotiate an end to the conflict. Military professionals face two challenges in looking past the military endstate. The first is understanding how strategies provide negotiating strength to allow for war termination. The second is effective communication with senior civilian leadership. This study draws on three wars as case studies: World War II in the Pacific, the Vietnam conflict, and the 1991 Gulf War. Evaluation of operational approaches and strategies, political decisions, and the termination of each war allows for added depth to the concept of relative advantage and how it contributes to favorable conflict resolution. An evaluation of the concept of center of gravity, used both strategically and operationally, is used to evaluate the utility of the concept of relative advantage. This study concludes that the concept of relative advantage allows commanders to apply military force in a manner that contributes to achieving political aims and support negotiating for war termination. The concept provides a heuristic where commanders can cognitively connect application of operational art to political aims and communicate how a military strategic goal, when achieved, will strengthen civilian political leadership to negotiate favorable conflict resolution.

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)