President Obama's 'Dual Track' policy of diplomacy and sanctions has been successful in persuading the Iranian leadership to enter meaningful negotiations at the Geneva talks. However the policy, as it stands, may not deliver the regional stability it seeks without broader regional engagement and integration with a regional strategy that recognizes the rapidly changing geopolitical situation in the Middle East. Thirty-four years of containment has institutionalized the enmity between the United States and Iran. American intervention in Iraq, the Arab Spring, sectarian violence in the Levant and the civil war in Syria have turned the geopolitics of the Middle East on its head. With growing success in its use of proxies, regional influence and national resilience, Iranian regional power is waxing as U.S. influence in the Middle East wanes. Many regional states and domestic audiences are unsure whether America has engaged in the Geneva talks to promote long term stability in the region or to facilitate an American rebalance from the Middle East to the Pacific. Ultimately however, the United States is the only regional player that can steer the region to stability. The key to engagement with Iran is their need for an economic recovery. However, neither Iran nor America's regional allies are unitary actors, so the United States will have to engage bi-laterally with Israel and the GCC nations to identify compromises that are beneficial to all. Zero enrichment and validation of Iranian nuclear compliance will need broad and detailed consensus beyond the P5+1. An agreement on Iran's nuclear capability will not deliver the regional security and stability that the United States and her regional allies seek. A mechanism to incrementally reduce sanctions at the same time as curbing an Iranian economic hegemony will therefore be needed to address Iranian terrorism and malign influence. The value of hindsight from previous failed negotiations with Iran has highlighted four broad lessons. Firstly, timing is critical. Too often, genuine approaches by one side have been exploited for purely tactical gain by the other. Secondly, expectations must be realistic. Iranian engagement will cease if the United States seeks regime change -- implied or explicit. Thirdly, Iran places significant importance on the language of mutual respect. Iran has proved willing to reduce its malign activity, but only if it is recognized as a nation state with a legitimate role in the region. Finally, America's regional allies, domestic opposition in Iran and U.S., and the international community may have reason to spoil the talks unless their interests are served. A broadening of the talks may allow a greater opportunity for all to perceive and sell the talks as a 'success'. In the short term, the United States needs to bring Iran into regional politics rather than isolating it, and facilitate an Iranian economic recovery to allow President Rouhani to sell nuclear concessions as a success to its population. Balancing this, both America's regional allies and its domestic population need reassurance that a 'win-win' solution is viable and does not risk their security. In the longer term, U.S. National Security Strategy will only be served if the Geneva talks lead to regional security and economic stability. This will require a revision of U.S. regional strategy and the generation of a convincing narrative that lays out a vision for a regional balance of power.

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