The Army is well acquainted with advising Host Nations (HN) and Host Nation Security Forces (HNSF). Major General Marquis de La Fayette from France and Major General Friedrich Wilhelm von Steuben from Germany advised the United States' Continental Army under General George Washington during the Revolutionary War. And the US Army can trace its advisory history to the Philippine War in 1899 with the establishment and training of the Filipino constabulary police force. In the Army's 238 year history, it has fought eleven years of conventional war with the myriad of remaining conflicts characterized as stability operations. As the Army looks to 2020, given budget and force structure reductions, it must determine how to best employ forces to advise HNs and HNSFs. In order for the Army to do so, it is essential it look at its past in order to address its future. In February 2007, the Department of the Army (DA) announced the advisor mission as its top priority. In 2009, then Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA) select, General Martin Dempsey, and US Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates, both proclaimed the importance of building HNSF capacity and the advisor mission as an enduring requirement. However, despite these proclamations, the Army never placed the requisite emphasis on the advisor mission. Given its long history of advising HNs and HNSFs, stability operations and Security Force Assistance (SFA), the US should have had the requisite expertise, plans, authorities, and organizational solutions readily at hand to address the full range of advising and partnership activities in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Department of Defense (DOD) must act now to avoid future advising and SFA difficulties and ensure that it does not disregard the hard-won lessons of recent experience. To address future advising, the Army should first capture and implement valuable lessons learned from the Iraq and Afghan wars while leaders experienced in advising are still serving. With the Army's implementation of the Regionally Aligned Force (RAF) concept in support of Geographic Combatant Commands, unit leadership will have some level of future responsibility advising HNs and HNSFs. With 9/11 and the attack by terrorists on American soil, US Army Special Operation Forces (US Army SOF) realized the importance of establishing interdependencies with General Purpose Forces (GPF) in conducting SFA, Foreign Internal Defense and Counterinsurgency missions--bridging the human and land domains along the Army's range of military operations. The emerging RAF concept coupled with the US Army SOF-GPF interdependency will definitely aid in future advising missions. However, structural shortfalls in how the Army conducts operations and missions still remain and require immediate attention. To address these drawbacks, the Army must conduct a thorough doctrine, organization, training, leadership and education and personnel review to address advisory capability gaps and in setting favorable conditions for the 2020 future force.

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