The wars in Afghanistan, and Iraq created an Army well trained, armed, and able to defeat an enemy fighting a protracted war. The skills and equipment required to conduct major combat operations above the company level have atrophied, leaving the force vulnerable against an enemy capable of conducting battalion, or above operations. However, the doctrine requiring the force to conduct major combat operations never disappeared, though pushed aside, or buried under a mountain of counterinsurgency focused doctrine, and theater requirements. Does the Army bring balance back to the formation in the latest release of Army Doctrine Publication 3-0 Unified Land Operations? This paper examines the question using the British from 1914-1921 using current doctrine as a lens to examine a military challenged with two very different wars in Europe and in Ireland during the same period.

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)