The Improvised Explosive Device (IED) has been responsible for more deaths and injuries than any other weapons system in both Iraq and Afghanistan. Despite a $58 billion dollar investment in C-IED capability, the Department of Defense has been unable to prevent this weapon from achieving devastating effects on military and civilian targets and threatening national objectives. Within the Army, continued organizational refinements to fighting formations combined with formalization of specific capabilities will better prepare Army units for operations in high intensity IED environments. Specifically, the creation of an organic Brigade Combat Team Counter-IED Fusion Cell, sufficiently manned and singularly responsible for the integration and synchronization of all Counter-IED (C-IED) initiatives, will significantly improve targeting activities within the BCT and enable a more offensive posture when confronted with active IED threats. The IED environment has proven too complex and too lethal not to have a sufficiently manned and dedicated staff element assigned primary responsibility for integrating C-IED information and synchronizing C-IED activities. The U.S. Army's experience with the IED in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the associated institutional response, demonstrate how unprepared the DOD was for the tactical and strategic impact of the IED. This analysis highlights how the defense establishment transformed from an organization which was unprepared for the emergence of this asymmetric threat to an institution rapidly and aggressively seeking ways to mitigate IED effectiveness. Trends relating to the continued global proliferation of IED technology and the affinity insurgents, guerrillas, terrorists, and criminals have with the IED are included to highlight the permanency of this threat and explain why military leaders should anticipate and prepare for continued exposure to the IED in future conflicts. Analysis of how BCTs approach integrating C-IED specific information and synchronizing C-IED activities will emphasize the need for a staff capability within the BCT dedicated to the analysis and synchronization of the IED fight. Fusion Cells are a proven concept, perfectly suited for integrating information and synchronizing activities against complex threats. Fusion Cells have been used successfully on multiple occasions in both Iraq and Afghanistan to attack complex networks and defeat IED threats. Furthermore, C-IED Fusion Cells are recognized in military doctrine as a necessity, at multiple echelons, when operating in high intensity IED environments. The Army should make C-IED Fusion Cells a resident capability within each BCT. Continued investments in capability within warfighting formations, singularly focused on the holistic defeat of the IED, will greatly enhance a BCT's ability to operate in the IED threat domain. The Army should continue to actively seek opportunity to improve methods, materials, organizations, and procedures, designed to help prevent and mitigate IED attacks. The addition of a C-IED Fusion Cell within each BCT provides a prime opportunity.

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