Currently, the Islamic Republic of Iran seems devoted to developing a nuclear weapon. It sees itself as an ascending power in both the Middle East and the world. Furthermore, experience with the west and recent examples of regime change in the region concern Iran. The nation's dedication to perpetuating the revolutionary regime and self-sufficiency makes Iran a difficult candidate for coercion. Conversely, its rhetoric and history of activities that run counter to international norms concern other members of the global community. Desire to see a world free of nuclear weapons and apprehensions of regional instability set Iran and the United States at cross-purposes where the United States seeks options to prevent a nuclear-armed Iran. The United States uses a strategy of coercive diplomacy to pursue a policy whereby the Islamic Republic of Iran does not become nuclear-armed. Despite this decade long endeavor, evidence suggests Iran continues to move ever closer toward such a capability. Questions continue to arise regarding the ability of the U.S. or any other party to coerce Iran. A review of conditions favorable to coercive diplomacy as well as consideration of the current ways and means of the strategy highlight gaps in the strategy. Concomitantly, this review elucidates additional options that may better address strategic ends, but likely with a substantial increase in risk. Unless an unspoken grand bargain is attainable, the U.S. must likely accept exceptionally greater risk or prepare to shift to a deterrence posture.

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