Since the conclusion of the Cold War, the United States has espoused engagement as its leading strategic principle. Despite this emphasis, engagement has yet to coalesce into a grand strategy. The US military, as one component of US power abroad, is often sub-optimized in the pre-crisis, peacetime realm where engagements occur. In this environment, colloquially titled "Phase Zero," the US military lacks an operational art. Defined as the linkage of tactics to strategy, the operational art in Phase Zero is an emerging field of study and practice. Special Operations Forces (SOF) provide unique approaches in Phase Zero environments. The examination of special operations approaches in Phase Zero provides insights into the challenges of devising and executing a Phase Zero operational art. By examining the intersection of policy, programs and posture in Yemen, Indonesia, and Thailand, tensions are identified and analyzed. Within these tensions, special operations efforts to construct a Phase Zero operational art are examined. This monograph concludes with observations about the logic, methods, and challenges of formulating a special operations operational art in Phase Zero.

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