This monograph analyzes the synchronization of field force operations in Vietnam from 1965 to 1967. Although the terminology of operational art did not yet exist in doctrine, operations during the period of rapid force escalation demonstrate the success at which MACV and the field force headquarters and commanders coordinated and synchronized actions in time, space and purpose. This synchronized coordination did not occur without challenges. As Carl von Clausewitz described through his paradoxical trinity, the necessary link between a clearly defined political endstate and a military strategy was absent. To highlight this tension from the US field force perspective, this monograph is divided into four parts. First, the introduction includes a literature review of impactful Vietnam War works accumulated and analyzed over time. The second part describes the national narrative leading up to and during the rapid force escalation period. The second part further provides a contemporary definition of the term strategy in the proper doctrinal context to ensure a common understanding. The third part is a campaign analysis that depicts the field force commanders, the command and control situation, and in depth views of four specific major operations. Although the period of rapid force escalation in South Vietnam is historically considered a campaign, in reality this period was a series of major operations that did not achieve the political endstate. This monograph concludes with an assessment of the degree to which the failures to synchronize a total campaign was the key problem for the US in Vietnam.

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)