This monograph is a study of the complicated problem of command and control in modern warfare. The challenges of command and control during the Vietnam War provide the basis for the exploration of an enduring matter of concern to military professionals. The goal of achieving unity of command is inextricably linked to the creation of a clear and logical command structure. Getting the command and control right is a precept on which military professionals pride themselves. A clear command structure ultimately enables military formations to synchronize actions towards a common aim or objective. This monograph analyzes the U.S. military's transition from advisory to offensive operations during the Vietnam War, specifically focusing on command structures and their impact on the synchronization of tactical actions. Despite an already complex situation brought about through hybrid warfare, policy-makers and senior commanders compounded the complexity of the war by establishing inadequate command arrangements. The result was a piecemeal application of military power remiss of operational coherence. This monograph explores the degree to which problems in command and control frustrated the synchronization of tactical actions.

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)