Why do Army stability operations fail to produce enduring stability in target countries? The Army has access to innumerable resources for mission accomplishment. Yet, when the U.S. Army pulls its last combat and peacekeeping or stability troops out of the supported country, historically, the nation too quickly returns to a security dilemma which threatens or destroys the opportunity for enduring stability. This research identifies institutional causes within the U.S. Army that limit its capability to foster stable post-operational environments. Doctrine, training, leadership and education, and policy, provide the framework from which one may detect institutional causes. Findings suggest that historic institutional biases against stability operations have restricted development in doctrine, training, leadership, and education. Similar difficulties at national levels and among senior military leaders have created inconsistent guidance for the execution of stability operations. In recent years, the Army acknowledged lapses in doctrinal development, training opportunities, as well as in the leadership and education of service members. The Doctrine 2015 initiative is a product of this acknowledgement. The new doctrine with Combined Arms Maneuver and Wide Area Security, identifies the concurrent stability environment and how it influences the tactical fight. Enduring stability is the operational goal in stability operations, and can only be achieved through deliberate planning and a whole of government approach.

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