This monograph describes the interaction and impact of the Afghan culture with the numerous instances of foreign intervention in the country. Prior to the American intervention in 2001, most recall of foreign intervention in Afghanistan focused on the Soviet Union's long endeavor from 1979-1989. Both the Soviet intervention and the subsequent rise of the Taliban sought to establish control of the tradition-bound and insular society, something that the British also encountered in their multiple occupations of the country. As the American and now the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) experience in Afghanistan now extends in duration longer than that of the Soviets, a reexamination of the British precedent reveals sober lessons available from the three Anglo-Afghan Wars and the Waziristan Campaign. A simple lesson begins with realizing the complex interaction of geography, history, and religion and how they intertwine to shape the way Afghans view each other and foreigners. Compound this complexity with the impact of the last thirty years of conflict that includes the mediocre rise and remarkable crash of one foreign power and the rise and resilient staying power of a largely internal organization, the Taliban. By examining the British and Soviet methods and results, along with those used in the rise of the Taliban, a common thread emerges that presents challenges for both NATO and for that of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. The population will have the ultimate say in the success or failure of any attempt at control. The evidence of this lies in both the foreign powers that have withdrawn their forces after long, bloody campaigns and by the Afghan governments whose rules ended after either the population rejected the reliance upon foreign assistance or after the government tried to reform a traditional society resistant to such reforms.

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