The purpose of this monograph is to examine the effect that military interventions have on the outcome of an internal conflict. This study employs quantitative analysis to examine interventions on the side of the government by unitary actors and coalitions. Additionally, qualitative analysis in the form of case studies was done on the United Nations Operations in the Congo in 1960-1965 and the United Nations Protection Force mission to Bosnia in 1991-1995. The findings are that the statistical analysis shows that intervention on the side of the government during stability operations has no effect on the outcome of the conflict. This lack of effect holds for unilateral and multinational interventions. The case studies highlight how various factors, to include a lack of resources, command and control deficiencies, and differing views on the role of force affected operational effectiveness.

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)