Coercion theory centers on an actor's ability to influence the decision making of an opponent. This monograph examines military operations in Libya 2011, Operations Unified Protector and Odyssey Dawn, through the lens of coercion theory. It seeks to answer the question: if the United States and its allies attempted to apply coercion theory against Gaddafi preceding and during military operations, why did he seemingly exhibit no behavioral changes prior to his death? This monograph purports that even though Operations Odyssey Dawn and Unified Protector succeeded in supporting the removal of the Gaddafi regime, ultimately they represent a coercive failure. The military operations in Libya in 2011 illustrate several central tenets of coercion theory. First, in order for coercion to be possible, the stated desired behavioral change must actually be intended. Furthermore, coercive demands must contain a plausible way out. Also, national and coalition objectives and agendas must be thoroughly enumerated and accounted for. Most importantly, whereas coercion theory provides military planners an excellent starting point for asking relevant questions, it cannot serve as a formulaic overlay to inherently complex and unfamiliar situations.

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)