The United States Army Reserve (USAR) experienced exceptional utilization since 2001 in the Global Wars on Terrorism (GWOT), requiring its transformation from a strategic to operational posture. The Army and USAR used the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) model to source combat rotations while executing this transformation, and currently plans to continue using it to plan readiness across the service. Throughout this endeavor, the USAR's officer vacancies were -- and will remain -- a key limitation to effective ARFORGEN manning. This monograph articulates the challenges the USAR faced related to officer vacancies and enumerates various mitigation efforts employed during the GWOT decade from 2001-2011. The author analyzes these efforts within the bounds of Unified Land Operations to identify whether the USAR implemented a campaign plan to address its vacancy problem. The USAR did not formally establish an Army Reserve Campaign Plan (ARCP) until 2010, and when established, the ARCP focused generally on personnel manning and distribution requirements, never addressing officer vacancies directly. However, the USAR's officer mitigation efforts are categorizable into four lines of effort: accessions, management, retention, and transition. In pursuing these LOEs, the USAR essentially executed the components of operational art to address its Officer vacancy problem. Because it lacked formal planning and recognition, however, the USAR's Officer vacancy mitigation campaign plan was insufficient to fully rectify its unfilled positions due to lack of proper phasing and transitions, poorly established end state, and ineffectively defining necessary or desirable conditions.

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