This monograph posits that military practitioners have a theoretical and doctrinal gap in understanding operational art. This threatens to separate tactical action from strategic purpose resulting in battlefield success that is orphaned by strategic frustration. To address this situation, this monograph proposes a theory of operational art, tempers it with historical case studies, and evaluates both Joint and Army doctrine. It demonstrates that, while operational art cannot overcome severe policy/strategic faults, it is necessary to successfully organize tactical action to achieve strategic aims. After describing both military strategy and tactics, this monograph proposes that the purpose of operational art is to bridge these two qualitatively different functions. To accomplish this operational art must bridge the conceptual-physical divide, negotiate boundaries, use tactical culmination to serve continuation, and manage political interaction. To accomplish this, operational art needs to have a structure that can understand strategic purpose, generate an operational logic, negotiate boundaries, and control tactical units. This four-part structure is the chain that links strategic purpose to tactical action. Three historical case studies provide insight into the functioning and limitations of the theoretical model. Major General Scott's Mexico City campaign (1847) provided an example of the successful application of operational art and that all four parts were necessary to successfully link strategic purpose to tactical action. General Westmoreland's introduction of ground combat forces into Vietnam (1965) demonstrated that poor application of operational art can lead to tactical action that does not contribute to strategic goals. It also provided an example of the limitations of operational art. It demonstrated the primacy of policy and strategic direction over operational and tactical capability. Finally, General Schwarzkopf's Operation Desert Storm (1991) demonstrated that operational art was successful in organizing the action of corps and divisions, but did not meet all of the Joint Force Commander's requirements. Joint and Army doctrine focus on different aspects of the theoretical model of operational art. Joint doctrine provides a detailed description of operational art's interaction with strategy/policy and how to negotiate boundaries. Army doctrine is strong a describing methods of control. Both provide for developing an operational logic. What is missing is the recognition that both are necessary to fulfill the purpose of operational art - to link tactical action to strategic goals. Specifically, Army doctrine tends to focus on the tactical action of large units at the expense of understanding operational art's relationship to strategy. This monograph posits that, in order to link tactical action to strategic purpose, operational art must have at least a four-part structure. It must understand strategic purpose, develop an operational logic, negotiate boundaries, and control tactical action. All four parts are necessary to ensure that battlefield action leads to strategic success. If one aspect is deficient, victory is in peril. Like tactics, however, the superior application of operational art cannot overcome serious faults in strategy or policy. In this respect military strategy, operational art, and tactics are interdependent and contingent upon a purpose that can only come from policy.

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)