After ten years of global conflict with al Qaeda, the time has come to reassess the threat and determine the parameters within which it operates. Questions regarding its continued validity as a threat, its capability to employ synchronized tactical actions, and its ability to act as a learning organization all must be addressed to better understand this enemy of the United States. The purpose of this monograph is to examine al Qaeda's ability to employ its tactical actions to achieve its strategic goals. This study hypothesizes that al Qaeda practiced operational art in the pursuit of its objectives. The methodology of this monograph analyzed two case studies that affirm the findings of this monograph. The first case reviewed the campaign against the United States that began in 1993 with the attack of the World Trade Center. The second case analyzed the campaign al Qaeda undertook in 2004 to discourage allies of the United States from participating in the war with Iraq. Both case studies were compared by elements of operational art: lines of effort, center of gravity analysis, and operational reach, to determine if al Qaeda practiced operational art to improve its ability to meet the strategic objective. This monograph also provides a way to predict al Qaeda's future actions by applying US Army doctrine on operational art as a tool for planners to see through the complexity of the enemy and their goals through a familiar and already understood framework.

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)