With combat formations schedule to begin drawing down in July 2011 and the role of US forces in Iraq already shifting away from the lead, the future of these two nations will grow increasingly dependent upon the indigenous security forces and the US advisors behind the scenes. In order to understand how to conduct successful advisory operations, it is worthwhile to compare the successful effort in Korea, from 1946-1953, with the as yet unsuccessful effort in Afghanistan from 2003-2010. In comparing the Korean and Afghan advisory operations, this monograph examines the nature of the two advisory efforts, the physical and political environments, the relationships between advisors and local forces, and aspects of the cultures involved. This comparison reveals that though there are many similarities between the two efforts, two components appear to have played a key role in the disparity of outcome that exists after eight years of effort--the nature of the operational threat and the susceptibility of the local culture to outside influence of the Afghan and Korean advisory efforts, this monograph shows key roles in how quickly an advisory effort can successfully accomplish its mission. The advisory efforts in both the Korean and Afghan cases started under similar uncertain and dire circumstances. Similarities also existed between the political and economic conditions of each country, as well as their physical geographies. Perhaps because of these similarities, US advisors pursued similar approaches and encountered similar problems. There were key differences, however. South Korea faced a conventional and largely external threat with military capabilities similar to its own while Afghanistan faced a divers and primarily internal non-state threat and required security forces with a greater level of sophistication. Additionally, the ethnic composition of Korea was homogenous while Afghanistan's was diverse; a factor that would influence the difficulty advisory forces faced in training indigenous security forces. Finally, the differences between aspects of Korean culture, built on centuries of assimilation of influences from China, Japan, and even the west, and Afghanistan's, built on a rich history of resistance to change and outside influence, greatly influenced the willingness of each to accept and ultimately inculcate US military advice. This monograph concludes that Korea's culture was "soft" and ready to rapidly assimilate US advice, making its security forces like a rabbit and capable of fast progress. In contrast, Afghanistan's culture was "hard" and resistance to US military advice, making its progress slow like a tortoise. Given the important role of culture in advisory efforts, cultural understanding and the manner in which advisors integrate with their counterparts, are critical to achieving success.

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