This monograph presents original research that seeks to reveal the relationship between individual personality type, as measured by the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI), and individual attitudes about the Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP). It contends that the relationship between individual personality types and attitudes towards the MDMP has evolved since the late 1990s in concert with the changing composition of personality types within the U.S. Army officer corps. Accordingly, this monograph questions the relevance and validity of the current MDMP process. Additionally, this monograph considers the role of personality types within the integrating staff elements of Division-level and higher staffs, and offers practical suggestions towards avoiding groupthink within integrating staff elements. Isabel Briggs-Myers and Katharine Briggs developed the MBTI as a system to describe individual personalities by their self-reported traits. Briggs and Myers describe these traits in terms of eight preferences and sixteen types. The U.S. Army has been using the MBTI for individual development and as a research tool since the 1980s. The personalities of people involved in the MDMP are as important as the process itself. Understanding the role of type diversity in staff work will enable leaders to carry out more complete and effective planning. According to various researchers, effective staff work requires the development and use of cross-functional teams, and the most effective cross-functional teams consist of members who have a variety of personalities. The varied perspectives and alternate approaches provided by a variety of personalities tend to complement each other as teams work toward solutions to staff problems. U.S. Army doctrine designates what researchers call cross-functional teams as integrating cells. Integrating cells are central to the Military Decision-Making Process. Previous studies have shown that cross-functional teams with a variety of complementary types tend to perform better than teams without variety. The predominance of certain personality types in the U.S. Army's officer corps limits the effectiveness of the cross-functional teams that make up its integrating cells. The lack of variety in individual perspectives and approaches to planning and problem solving inhibit effective staff work. First conceptualized by Dr. Irving Janis, groupthink is a theory that appears several times in U.S. Army doctrine. Doctrinal warnings describe the dangers of groupthink, but U.S. Army culture predisposes soldiers to its effects. In many cases, the cultural standards that give the U.S. Army its strengths become disadvantages when working in integrating cells.

Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)