The national will of the United States, and other democratic nations, is far more vulnerable today than in the past. Changes in society and technology have allowed enemies to adapt. The character of war has evolved into a more unorthodox type of warfare; one that uses transnational networks and information age technology to conduct guerrilla tactics, terrorism, and psychological warfare against vastly more powerful nations on a scale never seen before in history. Adversaries avoid conventional military engagements, exploit democratic vulnerabilities, and directly target national will in the attempt to slowly influence a long-term shift in that will. It is imperative for the U.S. government and the American people to understand this threat and find a strategy to maintain national will in the face of a determined foe. National will is the collective degree of political and popular support for national policies, foreign and domestic. This monograph divides those things that influence national will into two separate categories: contextual influencers and instruments of influence. Contextual influencers are the content of the information that affects national will: the perception of legitimacy, the perception of threat, and the perceived cost-benefit of the action. Instruments of influence are the vehicles that frame and transmit that information that affects national will: primarily the media, political rhetoric and opinion-maker engagement. Using this model of national will, this monograph examines several historical case studies of previous American conflicts (World War II, Vietnam, Somalia, Bosnia, and the Global War on Terror, including Iraq) to explain trends and identify ways national will can be nurtured and leveraged in future conflicts. The context of information and the instruments that provide that information both have an affect on national will. There is a correlation between favorable contexts, supportive instruments, and retaining national will. Those cases that Americans saw as legitimate, where an existential threat existed, and where actual costs outweighed expected benefits retained national will. Additionally, those cases that received favorable, accurate media coverage and bipartisan political support retained national will. As any of those elements weakened, the result would be a corresponding erosion of national will. This monograph outlines eight specific recommendations for sustaining national will: (1) only employ military force when there is a significant threat or vital national interests involved; (2) understand, through thorough analysis, all of the potential costs of war; (3) establish political and military objectives that are nested, realistic, and worth the potential costs; (4) use the "forces" necessary to accomplish the set objectives; (5) educate the public, frame the issues, and mobilize the nation into a united war effort that is commensurate with the scope of the conflict; (6) manage the expectations of the American people; (7) achieve durable bipartisan political consensus that marginalizes negative rhetoric; and (8) actively engage the media to provide information and context, and ensure standards are met while nurturing a lasting symbiotic relationship. Even the most brilliant strategy, the most technologically advanced weapons, the best tactics, and the synergy of all elements of national power will not matter if the United States cannot maintain its national will long enough to persevere. By carefully calculating when and how to employ military force, reducing the negative effects of partisan discourse, educating and mobilizing the American public, managing expectations, and engaging the media, the United States can maintain its national will long enough to achieve its strategic objectives in both the present and future conflicts. Now, more than any other time in history, the preservation of national will during conflict is more important than any other aspect of war.

Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)