As with a local insurgency, the Global War on Terror requires the US and her allies to win the support of neutral, wavering and hostile audiences in addition to defeating an enemy. At the tactical and operational levels of war, those audiences comprise the populations among which the US Anny and its enemies operate. The populations face competing demands for support both from US and from its enemies. In what is sometimes referred to as a war of ideas, populations caught between opposing ideological standpoints must, as a minimum, be influenced not to support enemies of the US. From a tactical and operational perspective, in order for the US to achieve operational success, the requirement to influence those in the middle ground has never been more acute. The increased importance of influence in US military operations is matched by an increased opportunity to do so. The Information Age, with its prevalence of communication technology and resultant dissemination of information, presents the US Anny with more opportunities than ever before to communicate with, persuade, and influence the populations that comprise this middle ground. In spite of this, Psychological Operations, the US Anny's primary capability for influence, is widely misunderstood and under employed. This monograph assesses the operational impact of failure to reflect the increased importance of, and opportunities for, Psychological Operations in modem military operations. By examining Joint and US Anny doctrine, US Anny organisation and structure, and finally, operational employment of Psyops, the monograph identifies a reluctance to acknowledge the potential of Psychological Operations. The monograph explores the factors that contribute to this reluctance and indicates that it is the inherently psychological nature of warfare, not the context of the Information Age, which demands a greater focus on Psyops. By focusing on the psychological aspects of operations, the US Anny will see beyond the enemy to influence audiences in the middle ground - the key to long term operational success. The monograph concludes that failure to make Psychological Operations a key pillar in the staff structure is a critical inhibitor to the complete integration of Psyops in modern combat operations, and recommends raising the profile of Psyops in structure, planning and operations in order to amend this failure.

Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)