The role of women in the armed forces has always been and will probably always be a hotly contested topic. Recent statements by senior civilian and military leaders illustrate the reliance the nation has placed on women in the armed forces. In view of the valuable role women play in the Army and the policies that govern their assignment, this monograph will address the question: Is the Army assignment policy for women relevant in the context of 21st century warfare? Many Americans are familiar with 'Rosie the Riveter', the iconic symbol of women in the wartime workforce during World War II. This further symbolizes the growing role of women in both society and the Army during periods of total war throughout U.S. history. From the early days of serving with the Army, to an institutionalized role with the Armed Forces Integration Act of 1948, and finally full integration with the All‐Volunteer Force, the role of women in the Army has greatly increased. Understanding the historical aspect of women in the Army provides useful background information for understanding the ongoing debate. The Army published Army Regulation 600‐13, its assignment policy for women, in 1992. The Department of Defense published its policy in 1994. Both policies originated at the end of the Cold War when major combat operations (MCO) thinking predominated in doctrine. Additionally, they were influenced by the MCO victory during Operation Desert Storm. Both policies intend to minimize exposure of women to direct ground combat instead of preventing them from participating in direct ground combat. While similar in wording, the two policies are different in two critical areas. First, the policies have different definitions for direct ground combat. Second, the policies differ on the issue of collocation. The DOD policy permits restrictions on assignment of women where units and positions are doctrinally required to physically collocate and remain with direct ground combat units that are closed to women. The Army policy permits restrictions on assignment of women where the position or unit routinely physically locates and remains with a military unit assigned a doctrinal mission to routinely engage in direct combat. The critical differences in the use of collocation and definitions of direct combat provide a framework to analyze current practices in 21st century warfare. The nature of modern warfare is certainly different from centuries past. The Army must operate across the spectrum of conflict, only a portion of which is MCO. Partially in response to this, the Army transformed to a modular force. Women perform duties in Forward Support Companies (FSC) that male soldiers previously performed in the Army of Excellence. Current Army doctrine advocates collocation of the FSC with its supported maneuver battalion, the majority of which have a doctrinal mission to routinely engage in direct combat. Current operations in Iraq and Afghanistan indicate that Army units are following doctrine and FSCs or sub‐elements/positions are collocating with their supported units. Female casualty figures and awards for bravery under fire and combat action illustrate the changed nature of warfare and the role women play in support of the Army on the modern battlefield. To remain relevant in the 21st century, the Army must change two aspects of its assignment policy for women. First, the Army must reword or remove the collocation restriction from its policy. Current doctrine advocates collocation and units in Iraq and Afghanistan are clearly following doctrine. If the Army deems the collocation aspect to be critical, it must reword the definition so it is clear and consistent with doctrine. Second, there are no longer clearly defined forward and rear areas. The modern battlefield has changed. The Army should take the lead in developing a common DOD definition of direct ground combat that matches the realities of 21st century warfare. If the Army does not act, civilian leaders may force it to take a giant step backwards in terms of opportunities for women.

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