This monograph discusses the importance of understanding time and distance factors when planning the operational movement of large units over great distances. Such road movements are complex and require a great deal of time to complete, and the commander and staff must be well versed in conducting them. This monograph examines those time and distance factors and shows how important they are in driving operational planning. The monograph first examines a historical example of such an operational move, specifically the northward shift of elements of Patton's Third U.S. Army in December 1944 to counter the German Ardennes Offensive. Next, the hypothetical movement of a modern Army-of-Excellence heavy corps is portrayed. Then the movement of a modern Soviet combined arms army is depicted and its formations are compared to their U.S. counterparts. In all cases complete road march data is computed, and specific orders of battle and march data are included in the appendixes to the monograph. Finally, various considerations and concerns when planning or executing operational movement are discussed, including the use of appropriate map scales, the availability of sufficient good-quality roads, the complications of moving through other formations, the difficulties in moving at night, the time needed to close in and resupply, the importance of security and deception, the possibility of "fast marching," and the inadequacies of current march-planning and execution doctrine.

ADA 174132 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)