This study analyzes three World War II operational mechanized forces in the offense to determine if there are common recurring characteristics or traits exhibited by those forces that precede and foretell a unit is approaching its culminating point. The operations are the German defeat at El Alamein, 1942; the Soviet defeat at Kharkov, 1943; and the German defeat at the Battle of the Bulge, 1944. FM 100-5 cites the Clausewitzian concept of the culminating point as central to understanding AirLand Battle and operational art; therefore, a commander that is more familiar with possible indicators and better understands historical examples of the culminating point has an advantage in making the necessary decisions in time to prevent his force from passing its culminating point or to allow him to take advantage of an enemy's. The study provides the reader: a better understanding of the culminating point concept and its relationship to implementation of doctrine, and some guides to alert of possible approaching culminating points, and a commonality of understanding of the culminating point through historical examples. Recurring events in all three operations fall into two broad categories: those events known to or caused by the attacker to himself and those brought about by the enemy. The overwhelming majority of events or traits which help bring about the culminating point are of the former; the attacker hastens his own culminating point more so than does the enemy. The study finds that a commander's overconfidence and stubborn commitment to a flawed course of action contributes most directly to his eventual inability to defend. The study concludes that a conscious awareness of the concept of the culminating point can pay great dividends to an operational level commander, but those commanders choosing to ignore the conspicuous events forecasting their culminating point will most likely suffer defeat as a result.

ADA 174327 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)