This paper explores the military's role in the processes of amnesty, reconciliation and reintegration (AR2). Its premise is that while the US and UK have devoted considerable intellectual energy and treasure to dealing with the current counterinsurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan, little thought appears to have gone in to what happens once stability and a legitimate government have been restored. In fact, it is clear that in the long term, counter insurgency (COIN) operations are usually just the first step toward conflict resolution which is concluded with the culmination of the amnesty, reconciliation and reintegration processes. This study examines the relationship between COIN operations and AR2 processes and assesses the military's role in both. The primary vehicle it uses to do this is a case study of conflict resolution in Northern Ireland since 1969. While the circumstances and events in Northern Ireland are distinct, if not unique from those in other contemporary instances of conflict resolution (not least as they took place in the context of a western liberal democracy), they point to some generic principles. In the first instance, conflict resolution in Northern Ireland was ultimately aided by an approach that balanced political, economic and military developments in the context of a society. While the UK government's initial overreliance on a security solution served mainly to further divide and impoverish Northern Irish society, resolution of the 'troubles' ultimately came about by political developments encouraged by economic incentives. Within this framework, the role of the military (as a subordinate element of the security forces) was, through a COIN operation, to lay the foundations for the AR2 that followed. In particular, the military needed to become cognizant of the possible negative impacts of some aspects of COIN operations on the AR2 processes. In addition to the evolving use of military power, the UK government also came to realize the effectiveness of outside mediation in conflict resolution. In the initial stages, the internalizing of the problem and the characterization of its resolution as a zero-sum game were not helpful. In doing so the government precluded meaningful political dialogue with many of the main protagonists, not least as the government was seen by many as part of the problem rather than its solution. It was only with the involvement of the United States and the European Union, as impartial mediators, and the government of the Republic of Ireland (to lend weight to the republican/nationalist cause), that real progress was possible. The study concludes that it is vital that the governments and militaries of the US and the UK look beyond the current fight when conducting COIN operations. In doing so, they need to utilize an inclusive, balanced and responsive approach that advances political, economic and security processes in a way that avoids one area having an adverse affect on the others. Critically, wherever possible, COIN operations should be conducted in a way that sets the conditions for AR2. In particular, military operations should not be seen as an end in themselves, or even purely as a way to support a legitimate government, but rather, in terms of their contribution to the vital processes of AR2.

Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)