This monograph examines the evolution and practice of operational art. The campaign for the reconquest of Burma in 1943-1945 as conducted by LTG William J. Slim while in command of Fourteenth Army is analyzed. The intent of the monograph is to evaluate theory in light of historical evidence, with operational art as the focus. The analysis reveals the importance of establishing a clear operational aim and of balancing the aim with means, ways, and risk. The Burma campaign is analyzed to answer two questions: what does the campaign suggest about the evolution of the operational art and what does it suggest about the relationship between the theory and practice of operational art? The two major operations of Fourteenth Army's campaign are described and analyzed. Slim set the aim of Fourteenth Army in both the Imphal-Kohima and Irrawaddy operations as the destruction of the main enemy force. To attain this aim Slim stretched his means to the limit, employed sound yet innovative ways, and accepted necessary risk. The analysis includes a discussion of Slim's application of certain theoretical aspects of operational art. These include center of gravity; decisive and objective points; interrelation of offense and defense; decisive battle; use of maneuver to create a force superiority; and strategic, operational, and tactical activities. The conclusion on evolutionary aspects shows how airpower was fully exploited and integrated into an overall campaign plan. Airpower was used for massive resupply and reinforcement, reconnaissance, close support of maneuver forces, and interdiction of supply lines. Concerning the practice of operational art, orientation on the main enemy force is shown to be central. Also, successful operational art entails taking limited means and stretching them with sound operational methods. In this, logistics and operations are inseparable. Furthermore, a keen sense of the differences and interrelationship of strategic, operational, and tactical activities is important to operational success. Finally, morale is shown to be an important aspect in the balance of aims, means, ways, and risks.

ADA 184734 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)