This monograph examines the current U.S. doctrine regarding the role of firepower at the operational level. It reviews the most recent doctrinal guidance on this element of combat power and the historical underpinnings of this doctrine in the works of twentieth century military theorists such a Liddell Hart, Fuller and Miksche. The effort is directed toward assessing the impact of firepower planned, resourced, and executed at the operational level; specifically the relationship between operational firepower and operational maneuver. The Normandy campaign from July to August in 1944 is studied as a historical case where firepower, employed by U.S. and Allied forces, was the catalyst for operational maneuver and the success of a campaign. This case study focuses principally on Operation Goodwood, Operation Cobra, and the Battle of the Falaise Pocket as examples where operational firepower played a preeminent role in the success of a series of operations culminating in the success of a campaign. Lastly, the monograph analyzes the lessons of this campaign and the relevance of these lessons for application at present in the NATO theater in light of changes since World War II in military technology and military techniques.

ADA 192832 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)