This monograph examines the problem of conducting a defense along a wide front. With the broad sectors assigned to some of our divisions in Europe and the huge frontages that divisions in contingency roles may be required to defend, this is a question that we need to address. This paper asks whether or not divisions should employ different tactics on wide fronts than along narrower ones, and concludes that the answer is yes. The monograph begins by defining just what an extended front is -- a difficult task since the Army promulgates no doctrinally assigned frontages to its units. The definition basically suggests that an extended front leaves significant avenues of approach into one's sector unblocked by major maneuver forces. The paper next analyzes current US doctrine and comes to two conclusions. First, it seems that the Army is relatively uninterested in the issue and that doctrine suggests that the conduct of the defense remains basically the same regardless of how wide the front is. Second, Army defensive doctrine stresses the concentration of defensive forces on the most likely avenues of approach, and the execution of & counterattacks aimed at wresting the initiative from the enemy. The paper then examines five historical case studies to attempt to reach some conclusions about US doctrine and the problem of width. These cases are: the US 24th Infantry Division's defense of the Kum River line in Korea in July, 1950, the Japanese 107th Infantry Division's defense of western Manchuria in August, 1945, the US 28th Infantry Division's defense of the "Skyline Drive" during the Battle of the Bulge in World War II, US "Task Force Persecution's" defense of the Driniumor River line in July, 1944, and the US 2nd Infantry Division's defense of the Naktong River line in September, 1950. Following an analysis of the historical examples, the paper will then contrast US defensive doctrine with Soviet offensive methods. By comparing the two doctrines in the light of the historical experience the paper will reach its conclusions. The paper ends by arguing that the prime imperative of defending along wide fronts is the delay of the Clausewitzian defensive culminating point. Rather than massing along expected avenues and seeking to gain the initiative early, the defender on a wide front should deploy his forces in a more balanced fashion and delay his counterattack or reserve commitment until he has forced the enemy to reveal his main effort. Along a broad front the defender may not be able to recover from maldeployment or from mistaken commitment of reserves. Wide fronts are intolerant of error.

ADA 179418 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)