During the summer and fall of 1982 the Israeli government used military force in an operation which they believed would achieve certain immediate political goals. Israel invaded Lebanon with an announced goal of clearing PLO terrorists from an area which threatened the northern section of Israel known as Galilee. While military forces initially committed to the operation were equal to the announced political goal, changes in policy which occurred during the operation created tensions in the campaign plan conducted by the Israeli Defense Forces. This monograph first analyzes the background of all active and supporting belligerents in order to ascertain the political and strategic goals which guided the participants. The plans for the operation are presented and the actual conduct of the invasion is described. Two aspects of classical theory--the identification of centers of gravity and the relationship between military means and political ends--are assessed in the light of the success and failure of the nations involved in the conflict. The monograph concludes that there was a glaring military means-political ends mismatch and that the Israeli planners failed in identifying the PLO center of gravity. The indications are that modern nation-states must be prepared to understand and fight any type of warfare on the conflict spectrum. Understanding of military theory and history assists the planner in these demands.

ADA 194741 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)