This study determines whether the U.S. Army is prepared to sustain U.S. units operating behind enemy lines as guerrilla forces. History provides many examples where guerrilla forces complement conventional operations. The "center of gravity" for guerrilla operations could be the ability to resupply and provide medical support. The study examines and analyzes for lessons learned the Chindits in Burma and three operations in Vietnam: Battle of the Ia Drang Valley, Task Force Remagen, LAMSON 719. Next it examines existing doctrine, equipment, and training of Special Operations Forces (SOF) using the lessons learned as operational benchmarks to determine if the U.S. Army could resupply guerrilla forces operating behind enemy lines. The study concludes that the Army has doctrine to effect resupply operations, has good equipment but needs more, and needs improvement in training. Without increases in equipment and more training, the Army may not be able to resupply guerrilla operations. It makes three recommendations: 1) Keep channeling dollars into specialized equipment which enhances covert operations and protects SOF. 2) Establish support relationships between SOF and helicopter battalions. 3) Maximize every training opportunity by practicing resupply and medical evacuation procedures as if the forces were operating behind enemy lines, simulating combat conditions.

ADA192493 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)