This monograph discusses how well U. S. Army doctrine exploits the development of weapons. With the rapid ongoing modernization of our forces, it is imperative that the army make the most out of new technology. The premise is that current U. S. Army doctrine and tactical writings fail to make the maximum use of the weapons that have been developed. The methodology used to defend this premise begins with an introduction to the problem. Disclosing that the struggle between weapons and doctrine is not new, the introduction continues by arguing that it is critical to strike a balance between weapons and doctrine. Next, the terms, doctrine, tactics and technology are defined and their relationship to weapons is discussed. The monograph examines three historical cases to illustrate the problem and to reach some conclusions on how doctrine might have better exploited the weapons being discussed. These examples are the Spencer repeating rifle in the Civil War, chemical weapons in World War I and the Sheridan armored reconnaissance assault vehicle that was developed in the 1960s. Following the historical analysis, the problem is updated by using the Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicle as a case study. The first step is a look at the technological development of the vehicle. The genesis of the Bradley is reviewed from the half-track to the future BIFV. A discussion of the impact of doctrine on Bradley growth and current employment follows the technological review. The monograph ends with an analysis of what effect the lack of doctrine has had on the Bradley and recommends a method to ensure that doctrine and weapons complement each other. On the next high or mid-intensity battlefield, technology guarantees intense and highly destructive combat. For the protection of U. S. army soldiers and the survival of our nation, it is imperative that doctrine exploits new weapons.

ADA 191042 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)