Several theoretical and doctrinal problems limit current US Army understanding of conflict, war and operational art. Those problems include confusion between conflict and war, ambiguity of theoretical terms such as "center of gravity" or "culminating point", and difficulty in describing the mechanism through which operational art links tactical successes to strategic aims. The premise of this monograph is that several of these problems can be attributed to a failure to understand war as a subset of conflict. The monograph attempts to outline a theoretical model of operational art as an aspect of conflict rather than of war. The theoretical relationship of conflict, war and operational art is presented using a "structure" analogy. Conflict theory is the foundation of the doctrinal structure. The structure itself encompasses both war and warfare ("actions short of war"). Operational art is a structural framework necessary for success in both war and warfare. The basic element of the conflict theory is ideas. Ideas are our perception of reality. Political entities are groups of individuals that share ideas about power and exhibit varying degrees of morale, discipline and cohesion. Conflict is the mutual contradiction of ideas. Conflict resolution is the competition of ideas between political entities. Its ends are the reconfiguration of the contradictory idea set. The fundamental components of its means are reason and violence. The competition is waged in the physical, cybernetic and moral domains. Aspects of that competition include fog, friction and chance. The basic component of the operational art model is linkage. Political entities designate a desired end state of conflict resolution; operational artists design military conditions that will realize this end state. The mechanism of decision in operational art is the dynamic interaction of combatants contesting their directed will and available means to achieve their respective end states. The operational artist applies military force through a combination of active and reactive measures designed to wrest the initiative from his opponent. Through the intensification of violence in space and time he achieves a series of successes that both destroys enemy forces and disrupts the morale, discipline and cohesion of the surviving forces. The consequence of these successes will be military conditions of dispersion, concentration and resilience of the combatant forces: the military contribution to achievement of the desired end state. The model has implications for our understanding of the role of ideas in conflict and war. It provides insights into "actions short of war." It suggests some potential deficiencies in the concepts and organization of our current doctrine of operational art. The model also demonstrates the critical consequences of theory for our understanding of war and operational art.

ADA 194883 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)