The purpose of this monograph is to determine the role of naval forces in land operations at the operational level of war. In the past decades, military failures were perceived by Congress as a result of the inability of the services to work effectively together. Accordingly, the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act directed reforms in the military establishment. Legislation chartered the Joint Chiefs of Staff to develop joint warfighting doctrine and institute reforms. Unfortunately, the services and not the joint staffs were delegated the responsibility for developing joint doctrine on the identified issues. Service proponency may result in the dissemination of parochial views. As such, changes will take years to achieve. Preceding this legislation, the services separately developed warfighting concepts in the Army's AirLand Battle Doctrine and the Navy's Maritime Strategy. Yet we may need a genuine unity of the services' warfighting capabilities in order to defeat the enemy. It must be determined how naval forces can contribute to the land war in the Central Region. This paper will examine the theoretical basis of operational maneuver and fires, and determine whether naval capabilities are compatible with these operational concepts. The criteria to determine the feasibility of employing naval assets as an operational maneuver force will be initiative, agility, depth and synchronization. The criteria to determine whether naval assets can provide viable operational fires will be depth and synchronization. Next, the paper will analyze an historical example of naval forces employed at the operational level of war in order to evaluate theory in light of historical evidence. Finally, using this model, the paper will suggest a role for naval forces in the Central Region. The conclusion of the paper is that at the operational level of war, naval forces can directly influence the ground war in the Central Region. It is necessary for planners to understand and articulate how best to use our maritime strength to help defeat a continental power like the Soviet Union. Carrier battle groups and amphibious forces can constitute a viable operational maneuver force against the enemy's flank. Equally important, carrier based aircraft, complemented by TOMAHAWK cruise missiles and naval gunfire, can provide effective operational fires. Naval power can contribute to the land campaign. As such, joint preparedness requires us to think and plan as a team.

ADA 215583 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)