This monograph discusses the role of the chief of staff at the operational level by examining both the current U.S. Armed Forces and the German General Staff system in World War II. The position of chief of staff at operational levels is a key to success and affects both command and control and morale in large unit operations. The monograph hypothesizes that current U.S. doctrine, officer education, and chief of staff selection and training may be inadequate in preparing officers for this position. The monograph first examines current U.S. doctrine concerning the role of the chief of staff. This doctrine is found to be inadequate as it does not give the operational chief of staff the required authority or adequately define the operational actions that this individual must formulate and supervise in the anticipated operational level of war. The monograph then indicates that commanders and CINCs must be given significant input in selecting their own chiefs of staff. Officer education, training and advancement is then examined and found to be too oriented to "command track" performance, with too little emphasis on preparing officers for chief of staff assignments. The monograph then analyzes the World War II German General Staff and German Army chiefs of staff at army group level. The monograph examines German General Staff selection, education, promotion, selection, and training; all of which were designed to produce competent high level commanders and staff officers. This overview includes selection procedures for the Kriegsakademie, the relative age and seniority of army group chiefs of staff, General Staff service, branch affiliations, previous command and staff experience, specialized senior leader training courses, chief of staff tour lengths, and chief of staff selection input from commanders. Finally, the monograph suggests that the current U.S. system can benefit by the German experience by expanding the role of the chief of staff in doctrine, and permitting commanders and CINCs to have considerable influence in selecting their own chiefs. The basic U.S. officer education system is found to be a good base for future fine tuning to provide better development of future chiefs of staff. Last, the monograph questions the utility of the "command track" officer development system which produces excellent commanders, but perhaps does not tailor senior officers for operational level staff assignments.

ADA 215584 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)