This monograph discusses German general officer casualties in World War II with respect to possible U.S. Army general officer losses in AirLand Battle. Such losses adversely affect both command and control and morale in large unit operations. This monograph hypothesizes that factors of doctrine, personal combat experience, training, and command rotation combined with battlefield lethality to cause extremely high senior officer casualties in German World War II Blitzkrieg operations; and will cause similar losses in future U.S AirLand Battle operations. The monograph first examines German general officer casualties, specifically 136 German general officer division, corps, and army commanders killed in action from 1939-1945. The monograph analyzes German war fighting doctrine, World War I combat experiences for these men, general officer training courses, and command rotation flaws which combined with the high lethality of the battlefield in World War II to help produce these significant losses. Next, the factors of AirLand Battle doctrine, Vietnam combat experience for current U.S. Army generals, general officer training courses, and anticipated command rotation policies are examined for similar trends in the U.S. Army. The monograph suggests that the factors examined for the German general officers are valid; they did contribute to the high senior officer losses the Germans experienced, and the similar factors looked at for American generals show the potential for similar losses if the U.S. must go to war. Although these anticipated losses cannot be fully eliminated, the paper suggests some means for reducing such losses.

ADA 211610 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)