The purpose of this monograph is to evaluate the doctrinal concepts underlying the U.S. Marine Corps' Small Wars Manual and the U.S. Army's Security Assistance Force (SAF), determining whether they are applicable today against a Maoist-led insurgency. In other words, does the doctrine formulated in the Manual and SAF over 50 and 20 years ago, respectively, have any utility in future Low Intensity Conflicts. In addition, the study questions whether these earlier doctrinal concepts, which attempted to isolate the insurgent through political, economic and social action, are more relevant than purely tactical military responses. The study begins with a brief overview of the political realities influencing U.S. responses in the Third World. Next, the monograph explores the historical development, purpose, and doctrinal concepts pertaining to the Manual and the SAF. The study finds these doctrines similar in several areas: (l) they recognize the protracted nature of a counterinsurgency, (2) they first attempt through non-military means to isolate the insurgent by gaining the populations allegiance, (3) they understand the importance of tactical intelligence, and (4) they advocate the use of propaganda to achieve their ends. Then, these doctrinal concepts are compared with those contained in Mao Tse Tung's writings. Not surprisingly, the comparison reveals a striking similarity between all three approaches to LIC. The monograph concludes by finding that the doctrinal concepts within the Manual and SAF are still very much applicable today since future insurgencies will, most likely, follow the Maoist approach. The study ends by recommending that a future counterinsurgency doctrine should employ a synthesis of both doctrines, thus combining the strengths of each. The product would possess the Manual's combined constabulary concept featuring U.S. and host nation tactical military forces operating as one unit together with the SAF's various detachments (i.e. civil affairs, psychological operations, medical, engineering, etc.) focusing on the underlying causes of insurgency.

ADA 210930 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)