For the past 40 years, the two U.S. Army corps in Europe have planned for the defense of the Inter-German Border. This defensive orientation has evolved into a science of delay with the hope of eventual counterattack and ultimate restoration of the border. The U.S. Army defensive doctrine has progressed through the concepts of area and mobile defense, the active defense, and now to the Airland Battle in which the focus is on the destruction of the follow-on forces while "fixing" the initial echelons. The key to success in conducting the Airland Battle is seen as the aggressive use of agility, initiative, depth, and synchronization by numerically weaker forces to disrupt the enemy decision cycle by attacking his command and control system. Additionally, the destruction of his first echelon forces' fighting capability is to be accomplished in combination with its isolation from combat service support and reinforcements. For this to work, the U.S. corps must be able to conduct operational moves to position forces and to conduct offensive operations to exploit opportunities. Critical to this effort is whether or not the current command and control system will support the operations required by the tenets of Airland Battle. Sophisticated new technology and vastly increased firepower may mean that future battles in Europe are likely to be more intense and of greater scope, so that they begin to acquire a different character from those of the past. However, the lesson from the past is that operational movement is essential to effective use of combat power within a theater. The command and control system of the U.S. Army corps today has several significant training, personnel, and equipment limitations which severely restrict its capability to perform operational movements such as those conducted by comparable size units in World War II and even World War I. This weakness in the basic fabric of command and control at the operational level is such that organizational, structural, and functional changes must be made in the U.S. Army corps in order for it to regain the capability to conduct operational movement in Europe.

ADA 215799 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)