JCS Pub 2 charges all services to "prepare for war and operations short of war". The U.S. Army has further defined operations short of war as military involvement in low intensity conflict. While the Army has made some effort at improving its capability in low intensity conflict, it is clear that preparation for war in Central Europe is the dominant priority and has been since the U.S. defeat in Vietnam. The U.S. Army at that time focused its efforts on Central Europe where its management expertise and firepower oriented organization could be justified. In the process, it relegated operations short of war to the fringes of the institution. This view of mechanical, capital intensive operations will fail us in Europe if we ever fight there. In the meantime it is leading us to failure in Low Intensity Conflict and Operations Short of War. The Soviets have been quick to take advantage of the opportunity in Central America presented by U.S. focus on Europe. The successful Cuban revolution by insurgency has been constantly improved through trial and error and Soviet logistical support. The result in Nicaragua is an entrenched Marxist government on the North American continent for the first time in history. The battle for America's rear area is taking place today in Central America. Some in the U.S. Army have recognized this fact and indeed, some measures have been taken to stabilize the area. However, the Army's firepower-attrition oriented mindset attempts to solve the problem by infusion of large scale capital items such as helicopters, gunships, and large artillery. The potential is to handicap U.S. allies and position them for slow strangulation and ultimate failure as in South Vietnam. The starting point in correcting this tendency is in leader education. The Army institutional school system will need to refocus to provide emphasis commensurate with the threat. The Army's leaders and soldiers must be refocused through guerrilla oriented training to thin mobility and destruction of the enemy's means to resist and his will to fight rather than simply firepower and attrition. The alternatives are clear, we can continue to focus scarce training and resources on Central Europe where there can never be adequate numbers available to preclude the use of nuclear weapons or we can refocus training and resources to assisting allies to combat insurgencies. The consequences of the wrong choice now may be considerably more costly in terms of manpower and resources to defend the U.S. Southern border later.

ADA 215801 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)