This monograph discusses the United States Army's chemical defense posture in relation to the chemical warfare threat in the third-world. It seeks to determine if current U.S. chemical defense tactical doctrine is adequate to counter the expected threat, and practiced enough to develop proficient execution in the field. Following an overview of chemical warfare, the study reviews the current chemical threat focusing on the third-world. It explores availability, proliferation, acquisition and development, means of employment, and factors limiting employment. After a discussion of U.S. chemical defense doctrine, the paper posits three scenarios of chemical use against Army forces in three environments: the jungles of Honduras, the desert plains of Lebanon, and the mountain passes of Korea. The study finds that the chemical threat in a jungle environment will be low, that in the mideast low to medium, and that in Korea high. Yet, in each of these third-world locations, regardless of the threat of use the probability of use, is not great. It argues that throughout military history chemical warfare has never lived up to its promise, and has never been tactically decisive. The paper concludes that the combination of the viable U.S. chemical defense doctrine with the non-decisive nature of tactical chemical weapons reduces the impact of battlefield chemicals, and that improved training will ensure this result.

ADA 225489 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)