This monograph discusses the United States Army's force generation posture in regards to contingency operations in an immature operational theater. It seeks to determine if the Army's current force generation system is adequate to support force projection into a bare base environment. Following an overview of force generation doctrine, the study reviews the requirements of the operational commander for forces and the capabilities of the force generation system to provide them in a meaningful way. It explores the internal and external sources of forces that the operational planner can rely on when developing the campaign plan for the theater of war or theater of operation. The paper focuses its effort by developing a scenario in which Army forces are generated to conduct a contingency operation in support of a friendly North African country threatened by a large, bellicose neighbor. The study finds that, in general, the U.S. Army force generation system can support a contingency operation in an immature theater, but that a lack of reaction time, an inadequate sustainment infrastructure, and insufficient combat service support forces will retard the effort. It argues that the unlikely chance of a significant level of mobilization complicates contingency campaign planning. The paper concludes that long term military action against anything other than a benign threat will prove difficult.

ADA 233997 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)