Changing times have brought with them new definitions of security threats and national interests. Within the military establishment, these changes have especially affected the Army. Thus, the Army is increasingly seeing the need for involvement in operations 'short of war.' The recently approved final draft of FM 100-20, Military Operations in Low-Intensity Conflict, acknowledges these challenges and presents an umbrella concept for the implementation of such operations. The manual also recognizes that the nature of the conflicts, as well as emerging demographics, require a force able to operate in an urban environment. Optimally, this force is a security force, composed of police, paramilitary, and military organizations, and according to FM 100-20, is used only within the confines of a higher internal defense strategy. Unfortunately, the U.S. Army has little experience on which to base actual implementation of such doctrine. The monograph first examines the doctrine of FM 100-20 in order to place in perspective the requirements of urban operations in low-intensity scenarios. This examination includes a brief discussion of the types of operations which are envisioned, as well as those functions which must be performed in order that urban operations may support the overall campaign strategy. Next, the threat is portrayed. This discussion looks at the threat from two vantage points -- first, in terms of classic urban revolution theory; and second, in terms of the models we have designed in response to such violence. Given these foundations, the experiences and doctrine of the British army are presented, in order to provide some perspective on our own experiences and doctrine, which are subsequently addressed. As discrete lessons, the experiences of the two armies are seen to be very similar. When viewed in the aggregate, however, the experiences have had quite divergent impacts on urban warfare doctrine. The British, with nearly continuous urban operations, have developed a unified doctrine specifically for low intensity situations. The U.S. Army, on the other hand, has had only limited experience in urban combat, and has developed a disjointed doctrine caught between the competing demands of high intensity and low intensity conflict. Finally, a new perspective is proposed for our urban operations. It is suggested not only that FM 100-20 include more on the urban threat, but that a framework be provided for urban operations in low intensity conflict. Called 'Urban Consolidation Operations', this framework would unite the disjointed elements of our doctrine, and in so doing, bring low intensity urban doctrine on par with that of high intensity urban doctrine.

ADA 234150 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)