The concept of "operational fires" has been proposed within the Army as one of several operating systems at the operational level of war in the same sense that Battlefield Operating Systems have proven their utility at the tactical level. However, the concept has not been so warmly receive and applied outside of the Army. In fact, the term appears nowhere in contemporary joint doctrine. The purpose of this monograph is to contribute to clarity of thought concerning the concept of operational fires through an examination of its theoretical, practical and historical basis. The monograph reviews classical theory as offered by Clausewitz, Sun Tzu, Douhet and Mitchell, and that interpreted by Soviets Tukhachevskii and Triandafilov in establishing a theoretical foundation for operational fires. The more contemporary views of several Soviet practitioners and those of Generals Rogers and von Sandrart from NATO are presented in order to accommodate the influences of advancing technology on operational fires. With the theoretical basis thus established, and using a "straw-man" definition for operational fires as a point of departure, the monograph proceeds with an investigation of several historical examples which offer insights into the nature of operational fires. In particular, Operations Overlord, Cobra and the Soviet Vistula-Oder Campaign from World War II and the initial phase of the 1967 Arab-Israeli Conflict are the selected examples which reveal some important common characteristics concerning operational fires. Following some analysis of the emerging consistencies found in theory and history regarding operational fires, the following revised definition is proposed: Operational Fires are defined as the application of firepower, often the product of coordinated joint and/or combined effort, directed by the operational commander as a fully integrated component of his campaign plan (operational concept), with design and intent to achieve a specified, high impact, operationally significant result through focused intelligence and targeting and effective massed and/or precision fires. The monograph concludes with a brief discussion of several implications of this definition, generally expressing concerns over designation of a responsible agent for the conduct of operational fires, and the effectiveness of intelligence and targeting support for operational fires.

ADA 234497 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)