This monograph examines the adequacy of command and control doctrine for joint amphibious operations in limited warfare, focusing on command and control structure and unity of command. Current joint doctrine in several new Joint Chiefs of Staff Publications addresses the issue of command and control for amphibious operations, but appears to be very general in nature. This monograph examined current doctrine to identify command and control guidelines. After guidelines were identified, two case studies were analyzed to determine how they met the guidelines for structure and unity of command: British Operation Corporate, landing on the Falkland Islands; and, United Nations Command Operation Chromite, landing at Inchon, South Korea. Findings include the pronounced primacy of politics over military operations in limited warfare, the need for clear communication of the operational endstate to facilitate exploitation of success, and the need for redundant command and control for amphibious operations. The monograph concludes with a summary of considerations for joint command and control, implications for current doctrine, and recommendations.

ADA 234490 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)