This monograph examines the Soviet Red Army's use of norms and nomograms in fire support planning and questions why the US Army does not use norms or monograms in the same manner. The Soviets argue that norms and nomograms allow them to provide fire support very rapidly, and free the tactical commander from the concern of recurring tactical decisions. This is one way in which they deal with what Clausewitz termed the "friction" of war. The monograph first examines the theory of developing and using norms and nomograms to quantify fire support planning, specifically their importance to both the Soviet socialist system and the Soviet military. It then examines the history of fire support planning in both the Soviet and US armies, including a comparison of past and current doctrines. Contemporary and future battlefield fire support planning requirements are discussed, with a look at how norms and nomograms apply to those environments. The author concludes that the US Army does in fact have its own system of fire support norms and nomograms, but they are used in planning quite differently than the way the Soviets use theirs. While the Soviets use commander's judgment and experience to supplement their norms, the US uses norms to supplement the commander's judgment and experience. These dissimilar approaches are based upon cultural differences and the capabilities that both armies have to carry out their doctrine. Both approaches attempt to overcome or minimize the "friction" of war.

ADA 225437 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)