Many authors in recent years have lamented the decrease of dismounted infantrymen in J-series Bradley mechanized infantry units. This decrease is often described as a shortage and portrayed as a critical weakness of Bradley units. This monograph takes a fundamentally different approach to the issue and examines not whether there are enough infantrymen in Bradley units but whether Bradley units can generate sufficient combat power to win on the battlefield with the vehicles, men, weapons systems, and organization they currently have. In pursuing the answer to this question, the author employs Brigadier General Huba Wass de Czege's Relative Combat Power Model to analyze how well Bradley units perform doctrinal missions against the typical Soviet force arrays they could expect to see on the modern battlefield. Data and reports on field performance, particularly lessons learned from NTC rotations, provide valuable insights into Bradley unit strengths and weaknesses as they apply to firepower, maneuver, protection, and leadership. Analysis of field performance under the Relative Combat Power Model indicates that the fewer number of dismounted infantrymen in Bradley units is not so much a problem as how those units are organized and employed. The author argues that current Bradley squad and platoon organization works against optimal training and tactical performance. Careful consideration should be given to separating the mounted and dismounted elements of a Bradley platoon. Such a separation would allow the platoon leader and company commander to employ both the dismounted and mounted elements more effectively and efficiently. The author's analysis also suggests several critical issues the commander ought to take into consideration when planning tactical operations around Bradley units attrited by combat. Among these issues are the tradeoff between survivability of positions and security, the attendant risks of employing dismounted infantrymen away from their M2s, the impact of fatigue upon performing multiple missions in continuous operations, and the relative impact of dispersion in Bradley units on firepower, maneuver, and leadership/C2.

ADA 225487 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)