The concept of the culminating point has great utility for the tactical commander. It is one of three concepts fundamental to the design and execution of major operations. Our doctrine addresses the culminating point in operational terms but its impact at the tactical level cannot be neglected. Field Marshal Erwin Rommel's attack of Montgomery's British Eighth Army at Alam Halfa showed a numerically inferior, logistically weak force opposed by a superior defender. His defeat was as much a product of British abilities to cause combat losses as it was of his own lack of ability to support himself logistically across the vast expanse of North African desert. The Israeli defense of the Golan Heights in 1973 presents the case of a numerically inferior defender unable to trade space for time facing an overwhelmingly superior attacker. Threatened with a two front war, Israel chose to quickly defeat Syria on its northern border before turning south to defeat Egypt in the Sinai. An analysis of both historical examples yields many lessons for the tactical commander. The purpose of this monograph is to explain the concept of the culminating point at the tactical level, illustrate the concept by using historical examples, and specifically address implications for the tactical commander who must defend from fixed battle positions.

ADA 225466 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)